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Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI),
which originate in poultry upon transmission of low patho-
genic viruses from wild birds, have occurred relatively fre-
quently in the last decade. During our ongoing surveillance
studies in wild birds, we isolated several influenza A virus-
es of hemagglutinin subtype H5 and H7 that contain vari-
ous neuraminidase subtypes. For each of the recorded H5
and H7 HPAI outbreaks in Europe since 1997, our collec-
tion contained closely related virus isolates recovered from
wild birds, as determined by sequencing and phylogenetic
analyses of the hemagglutinin gene and antigenic charac-
terization of the hemagglutinin glycoprotein. The minor
genetic and antigenic diversity between the viruses recov-
ered from wild birds and those causing HPAI outbreaks
indicates that influenza A virus surveillance studies in wild
birds can help generate prototypic vaccine candidates and
design and evaluate diagnostic tests, before outbreaks
occur in animals and humans.
W
ild birds, predominantly ducks, geese, and shore-
birds, form the reservoir of influenza A viruses in
nature (1,2). Influenza A viruses are subtyped on the basis
of the antigenic properties of the hemagglutinin (HA) and
neuraminidase (NA) glycoproteins, expressed on the sur-
face of virus particles. To date, 16 HA and 9 NA subtypes
have been detected in wild birds and poultry throughout
the world (3,4). Viruses containing HAof subtypes H5 and
H7 may become highly pathogenic after introduction in
poultry and cause outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI, formerly termed fowl plague) (1,2). The
switch from a low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) phe-
notype, common in wild birds and poultry, to the HPAI
phenotype is achieved by the introduction of basic amino
acid residues into the HA0 cleavage site (5). HPAI isolates
have been obtained primarily from commercially raised
birds such as chickens, turkeys, quail, guinea fowl, and
ostriches (6). In the last decade, the frequency of detected
HPAI outbreaks has increased, with outbreaks of avian
influenza A viruses of subtype H5N2 in Mexico (1994);
Italy (1997) and Texas (2004); H5N1 in Hong Kong
(1997) and Southeast Asia (ongoing since 1997); H7N3 in
Australia and Pakistan (1994); H7N4 in Australia (1997);
H7N1 in Italy (1999); H7N3 in Chile (2002) and Canada
(2003); and H7N7 in the Netherlands (2003) (7–15). 
Influenza A viruses of subtypes H5 and H7 have been
frequently detected in mammals (16). H7N7 viruses have
been endemic in horses for some time (17), were transmit-
ted from seals to humans in the United States in 1980
(18,19), and were isolated from humans in the United
Kingdom in 1996 (20) and the Netherlands in 2003
(12,13). H7N2 and H7N3 influenza A viruses were isolat-
ed from humans in the United States in 2003 (21,22) and
Canada in 2004 (23), respectively. HPAI H5N1 viruses cir-
culating in Southeast Asia since 2003 have been detected
in at least 108 human cases of respiratory illness, of which
54 were fatal (24). In addition, these H5N1 influenza A
viruses have been detected in pigs (25), cats, leopards, and
tigers (26–29) in Southeast Asia. As a consequence of the
relatively frequent zoonoses caused by influenza Aviruses
of subtypes H5 and H7, these virus subtypes are given high
priority with respect to pandemic preparedness. 
Wild birds harbor the LPAI ancestral viruses of HPAI
strains of poultry (and mammals). In our influenza A virus
surveillance studies in wild birds in northern Europe, we
detected numerous influenza A viruses of subtype H5 and
H7 in Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos). We show that for
each of the HPAI outbreaks that occurred in Europe since
1997, we have found close LPAI relatives in Mallards. Our
observations indicate that influenza Avirus surveillance in
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Materials and Methods
Specimens
In our ongoing influenza Avirus surveillance studies in
wild birds in northern Europe (30), Mallards were trapped
with duck traps in Lekkerkerk and Krimpen aan de Lek in
the Netherlands and Ottenby Bird Observatory on the
southernmost point of the island Öland in Sweden
(Figure 1). Cloacal samples were collected with cotton
swabs and stored in transport media consisting of Hanks’
balanced salt solution, 10% vol/vol glycerol, 200 U/mL
penicillin, 200 µg/mL streptomycin, 100 U/mL polymyxin
B sulfate, and 250 µg/mL gentamicin (MP Biomedicals,
Zoetermeer, the Netherlands) at –70ºC.
RNA Isolation and Virus Detection
RNA isolation and reverse transcription–polymerase
chain reaction (RT-PCR) were performed as described pre-
viously (32) for samples obtained until 2002. Beginning in
2003, RNAwas isolated by using a MagnaPure LC system
with the MagnaPure LC Total nucleic acid isolation kit
(Roche Diagnostics, Almere, the Netherlands), and
influenza A virus was detected by using a real-time RT-
PCR assay (33). To ensure efficient influenza A virus
detection, the published probe sequence was changed to 6-
FAM-TTT-GTG-TTC-ACG-CTC-ACC-GTG-CC-
TAMRA-3′, based on the avian influenza A virus
sequences available from public databases. Amplification
and detection were performed on an ABI7700 machine
with the TaqMan EZ RT-PCR Core Reagents kit (Applied
Biosystems, Nieuwerkerk aan den IJssel, the Netherlands)
by using 20 µL eluate in an end volume of 50 µL. Pools of
5 individual samples were prepared and processed in par-
allel with several negative and positive control samples in
each run. Upon identification of influenza Avirus–positive
pools, RNAisolation and RT-PCR procedures were repeat-
ed for the individual samples within each positive pool;
individual RT-PCR–positive samples were subsequently
used to isolate virus.
Virus Isolation and Characterization
For influenza A virus RT-PCR–positive samples, 200
µL original material was injected into the allantoic cavity
of 11-day-old embryonated hens’ eggs. The allantoic fluid
was harvested 2 days after injection, and influenza A virus
was detected by using hemagglutination assays with
turkey erythrocytes. When no influenza A virus was
detected on the initial virus isolation attempt, the allantoic
fluid was passaged once more in embryonated hens’ eggs.
Virus isolates were characterized with a hemagglutination
inhibition (HI) assay with turkey erythrocytes and sub-
type-specific hyperimmune rabbit antisera raised against
all HA subtypes (4,34).
Sequence Analysis and Phylogenetic Trees
NA subtypes of influenza A virus isolates were charac-
terized by RT-PCR and sequencing. RT-PCR and sequenc-
ing of the HAand NAgenes were performed essentially as
described by others (35). PCR products were purified from
agarose gels with the Qiaquick Gel Extraction kit (Qiagen,
Leusden, the Netherlands) and sequenced with the Big
Dye terminator sequencing kit version 3.0 (Amersham
Pharmacia Biotech, Roosendaal, the Netherlands) and an
ABI PRISM 3100 genetic analyzer (Applied BioSystems),
according to the instructions of the manufacturer. All
primer sequences are available upon request. Nucleotide
and amino acid sequences were aligned by using the
ClustalW program running within the BioEdit software
package, version 5.0.9 (36). We first generated trees for H5
and H7 by using all full-length HA1 amino acid sequences
available from public databases. Amino acid sequence
alignments were bootstrapped 100 times, and distance
matrices were generated by using Kimura parameters. The
trees were generated by using the UPGMA (unweighted
pair-group method with arithmetic mean) clustering
method of the Neighbor program of PHYLIP version 3.6
(37). The consensus of 100 UPGMA trees was calculated,
and the branch lengths of this consensus tree were recalcu-
lated by using the Fitch program of PHYLIP 3.6.
For selected influenza A virus isolates of European ori-
gin, DNA maximum-likelihood trees were generated by
using full-length HA nucleotide sequences from which the
sequences encoding the HA cleavage site were excluded.
Alignments were bootstrapped 100 times by using the
Seqboot package of PHYLIP version 3.6, and trees were
constructed with the Dnaml package, using 3 jumbles. The
consensus tree was calculated by using the Consense pack-
age of PHYLIP3.6; this tree was used as usertree in Dnaml
to recalculate the branch lengths from the nucleotide
sequences. Finally, the trees were rerooted at midpoint by
using the Retree software of PHYLIP3.6. Trees were visu-
alized with the Treeview 1.6.6 program distributed with
BioEdit version 5.0.9. All nucleotide sequences presented
here are available from GenBank under accession numbers
AY684894, AY338460, AY995883–AY995898, and
AY999977–AY999991.
Serology
HI assays were performed to compare the antigenic
properties of influenza A virus strains by using postinfec-
tion ferret antisera and hyperimmune rabbit antiserum
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A/Tern/South Africa/61 (H5N3), A/Duck/Hong Kong/
205/77 (H5N3), A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1), A/Equine/
Prague/1/54 (H7N7), A/Seal/Massachusetts/1/80 (H7N7),
A/Mallard/Netherlands/12/00 (H7N3), A/Netherlands/
033/03 (H7N7), and A/Netherlands/219/03 (H7N7), as
described previously (4,34). HI assays were performed in
duplicate. All serum samples were treated overnight with
receptor-destroying enzyme at 37ºC and subsequently
incubated at 56ºC for 1 hour. Twofold serial dilutions of
each antiserum, starting at a 1:20 dilution, were tested for
their ability to inhibit the agglutination of horse erythro-
cytes by 4 hemagglutinating units of influenza A virus.
Serum dilutions were made in phosphate-buffered saline
(PBS) containing 0.5% vol/vol bovine serum albumin
(BSA, fraction V, Gibco, Breda, the Netherlands). Horse
erythrocytes were stored in PBS containing 0.5% vol/
vol BSA. In the HI assay, 50 µL of a 1% vol/vol horse
erythrocyte dilution was added to each well (38). 
Results
Avian Influenza A Virus in Wild Birds in Europe
Of 172 virus isolates obtained within this study period,
33 contained HA genes of subtypes H5 or H7, 6 were of
subtype H5N2, 2 were H5N3, 1 was H5N6, 8 were H5N9,
1 was H7N3, 14 were H7N7, and 1 was H7N9. All H5 and
H7 influenza Aviruses were isolated from samples collect-
ed from Mallards during fall migration at marshalling sites
in the Netherlands (1 H5 isolate from October 1999 and 1
H7 isolate from December 2000) and Sweden (all other H5
and H7 isolates collected from September to January 2002)
(Figure 1). 
Characterization of H7 Influenza A Viruses
Sequence analyses of the HA open reading frames
(ORFs) of the 16 H7 influenza A viruses isolated from
Mallards showed that the HA0 cleavage site lacked basic
amino acid residues, which is typical for LPAI viruses. We
next determined the genetic relationship between the HA
genes of our H7 influenza A viruses isolated from
European Mallards and those available from public
sequence databases. The phylogenetic tree, based on HA1
amino acid sequences, showed the typical separation of H7
strains in the Eurasian and American genetic lineages.
Within the Eurasian H7 HAlineage, the European Mallard
influenza A viruses were found in different parts of the
tree, clustering closely with influenza A viruses responsi-
ble for recent H7 HPAI outbreaks in Europe (Figure 2A).
We next generated a DNA maximum-likelihood phyloge-
netic tree by using prototypic European Mallard influenza
A viruses and strains representing each of the H7 HPAI
outbreaks that occurred in Europe (H7N1 in Italy
2000/2001 and H7N7 in the Netherlands 2003) in the last
decade (Figure 2B). This tree showed the cocirculation of
2 genetically distinct lineages of H7 HA in European
Mallards, 1 closely related to H7N7 and H7N1 HPAI
strains causing outbreaks in the Netherlands (2003) and
Italy (2000/2001) and 1 closely related to the H7N7 isolate
obtained from a woman with conjunctivitis in the United
Kingdom in 1996 (20). The maximum nucleotide/amino
acid sequence identity between the Italian H7N1 HPAI
virus A/Chicken/Italy/445/99 and the most closely related
LPAI virus A/Mallard/Netherlands/12/00 was 98% nt and
98% amino acids (aa). The maximum nucleotide/amino
acid identity between the Dutch H7N7 HPAI virus
A/Chicken/Netherlands/1/03 and the most closely related
LPAI virus A/Mallard/Netherlands/12/00 is 98% nt and
99% aa. The maximum nucleotide/amino acid identity
between the LPAI virus A/Mallard/Sweden/56/02 and
A/Turkey/Ireland/ PV74/95 (H7N7) was 95% nt, 96% aa;
between A/Mallard/Sweden/56/02 and A/England/268/96
(H7N7), it was 96% nt and 97% aa.
We next analyzed the antigenic relatedness of the H7
influenza A viruses obtained from wild Mallards in HI
assays with postinfection ferret antisera and hyperimmune
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Figure 1. Main fall migration route of wild waterfowl in northern
Europe (31). The sample locations Öland (Sweden) and
Lekkerkerk and Krimpen a/d Lek (the Netherlands) are marked
with asterisks.rabbit antisera. The hyperimmune rabbit antisera were
chosen on the basis of their ability to provide a broad
response, which would recognize a wide range of strains
within 1 subtype, whereas the postinfection ferret antisera
were chosen on the basis of high specificity. HI assays
showed that the antigenic properties of the H7 influenza A
viruses from Mallards were relatively conserved, and that
the HI data for the Mallard influenza Aviruses did not dif-
fer significantly (i.e, up to 4-fold) from those obtained with
strains causing the HPAI outbreak in the Netherlands in
2003 (Table 1). The antigenic analyses therefore confirmed
the genetic data, which showed little genetic diversity
between the H7 strains isolated from wild Mallards and the
strains causing the H7 HPAI outbreaks.
Sequence Analysis, Phylogeny, and Antigenic
Characterization
Sequence analyses of the HA ORFs of the 17 H5
influenza A viruses isolated from Mallards showed that
the HA0 cleavage site lacked basic amino acid residues,
which is typical for LPAI viruses. To determine the genet-
ic relationship between the H5 influenza A virus isolates
obtained from wild birds and strains causing recent H5
HPAI outbreaks (H5N2 in Italy 1997), we generated a
phylogenetic tree based on the amino acid sequences of
the HA1 domain of all H5 influenza A viruses currently
available from public sequence databases (Figure 3A). As
for H7, this tree showed the 2 clearly distinguishable
Eurasian and American genetic lineages. The H5 HA
sequences that we obtained from influenza A viruses iso-
lated from European Mallards were closely related to the
influenza Avirus strains responsible for the H5 HPAI out-
break in Italy in 1997. The H5 HPAI influenza A strains
isolated in Southeast Asia beginning in 1997 form a con-
tinuous genetic lineage, presumably evolving from a com-
mon LPAI wild bird ancestor around 1997 (15). Similarly,
we did not detect close relatives of the recent HPAI Asian
strains in Mallards in Europe (Figure 3A). The DNAmax-
imum likelihood tree based on the full-length HA
nucleotide sequences of the 17 H5 HA genes of Mallard
influenza A viruses and those of the Italian H5 HPAI
influenza A viruses confirmed the close genetic relation-
ship (Figure 3B). Maximum nucleotide/amino acid identi-
ty between the Italian HPAI virus A/Chicken/Italy/312/97
H5N2 and the most closely related LPAI virus,
A/Netherlands/3/99 H5N2, is 96% nt identity and 98% aa
identity (Figure 3B).
In HI assays with postinfection ferret antisera and
hyperimmune rabbit antisera raised against H5 influenza
A viruses, the influenza A viruses obtained from wild
Mallards were antigenically conserved and did not differ
significantly (up to 4-fold) from the prototypic strains
used in the HI assay (Table 2). In agreement with the phy-
logenetic analysis of the current H5N1 HPAI influenza A
viruses from Southeast Asia, the antigenic properties of
H5N1 influenza virus A/Vietnam/1194/04 differ signifi-
cantly from those of the LPAI strains isolated from
Mallards used in this study, when analyzed with the high-
ly specific postinfection ferret antisera. Hyperimmune
rabbit antisera failed to discriminate the antigenic proper-
ties of all strains because of the broader antigenic reactiv-
ity of these sera.
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Figure 2. Phylogenetic trees of hemagglutinin H7 sequences. A)
Phylogenetic tree based on the amino acid sequence distance
matrix for the HA1 open reading frames of all H7 sequences avail-
able from public databases. The scale bar represents ≈10% of
amino acid changes between close relatives. *Represents the
locations of the Mallard influenza A virus isolates. B) DNA maxi-
mum likelihood tree for the European highly pathogenic avian
influenza viruses and the low pathogenic avian influenza H7
influenza A viruses isolated from migrating Mallards by using
A/FPV/Dutch/27 as outgroup. The scale bar represents 10% of
nucleotide changes between close relatives. Discussion
Because HPAI outbreaks in poultry find their origin in
LPAI viruses present in waterfowl, influenza A virus sur-
veillance in wild birds could function as an early warning
system for HPAI outbreaks and as a means to keep panels
of reference reagents, required for diagnostic purposes and
vaccine production, up-to-date (39,40). Wild bird surveil-
lance would also be relevant for HPAI viruses that represent
pandemic threats. However, limited information on the
prevalence of avian influenza A viruses in wild birds in
Europe, and on the genetic and antigenic variability of the
viruses in this part of the world, has made assessing the
value of such surveillance studies difficult. We isolated
avian influenza A viruses of subtypes H5 and H7 from
Mallards in northern Europe. During a 4-year surveillance
period, we isolated influenza A viruses of subtypes H5N2,
H5N3, H5N6, H5N9, H7N3, H7N7, and H7N9, among
many other influenza A virus isolates. All of these H5 and
H7 influenza A virus isolates were obtained from Mallards
during fall migration at a Swedish location and at 2 Dutch
wintering sites. Using this relatively limited setting, we iso-
lated influenza A viruses that possess H5 and H7 glycopro-
teins and gene segments closely related to those of influenza
A viruses responsible for HPAI outbreaks in Europe, H5N2
in Italy (1997), H7N1 in Italy (1999–2000), and H7N7 in
the Netherlands (2003). Thus, we conclude that influenza A
virus surveillance in wild birds is useful to keep the panels
of reference reagents up-to-date. Whether surveillance stud-
ies could be useful as a sentinel system is uncertain.
We observed minor antigenic and genetic diversity
between the HA genes of Mallard influenza A virus iso-
lates and those of HPAI virus strains. This finding implies
that the influenza Avirus isolates obtained during wild bird
surveillance studies may also be prototypic vaccine candi-
dates for human or veterinary use. Limited numbers of
prototype vaccine strains, representing both the American
and Eurasian genetic lineages of influenza A virus, could
be generated to cover a wide range of HPAI strains. Such
vaccine seed strains can be produced well ahead of out-
breaks in poultry, other animals, or humans. The disadvan-
tage of the minor antigenic differences between the
vaccine strain and the epidemic strains will likely be com-
pensated by the immediate availability of the vaccine. An
additional advantage of the use of LPAI strains from wild
birds as prototype vaccine strains is that they do not con-
tain a basic cleavage site in the HA gene. Before HPAI
strains can be used as vaccine candidates, the basic amino
acid residues in the HA gene need to be removed by using
reverse genetics technology; this would result in an extra
modification step, which would consume precious time.
Moreover, these vaccine strains can only be generated after
an outbreak of HPAI has started.
We suggest that a thorough genetic and antigenic char-
acterization of avian influenza A viruses isolated in the
Mallards and Avian Influenza Viruses, Northern Europe
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outbreaks. While this usefulness has been demonstrated in
our study with influenza A viruses of the H5 and H7 sub-
types, it should be applied also to other influenza A virus
strains relevant to animal and public health, in particular,
those of subtypes H1, H2, H3, and H9.
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